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Abstract—Modeling power market dynamics is increasingly
challenging, as both spatial and temporal imbalances of demand
and supply are becoming more pronounced with higher shares
of variable renewable energy (VRE). Therefore, a high-resolution
spatial and temporal distribution of both VRE and conventional
generation, as well as the load, is necessary for modeling the effect
of policy measures on the electricity market. Besides, technical
constraints must be considered in detail, as they fundamentally
influence market outcomes. This contribution presents the results
and findings from a power market simulation model for the
case of the German market zone under different scenarios
phasing out coal-fired power generation. It is shown that the
developed spatially resolved model can realistically reproduce
market outcomes and is, therefore, suitable for the analysis of
future scenarios with increased VRE integration and reduced
conventional generation capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2014, the Climate Action Program 2020 was
adopted by the German government, with the ambitious plan
of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 40 % compared with
1990 levels by 2020 [1]. Although Germany has witnessed a
successful expansion of renewable capacities, which provided
it with about 157 TWh of electricity in the year 2018, a large
share of electricity generation still comes from power plants
fired by fossil fuels, with coal-fired generation making up
around 204 TWh in 2018 [1], [2]. The decision on phasing-out
nuclear power generation by 2022 makes the CO2 reduction
goal even more challenging to achieve. In order to close
the apparent gap, an accelerated coal phase-out has been
advised by the Commission on Growth, Structural Change,
and Employment in her final report [3], suggesting the end of
the usage of coal for power generation by the year 2038 at
the latest.
A phase-out of coal-fired generation will have significant
effects on the energy market results and dynamics. One
expected effect is a higher market share for flexible gas-fired
power plants, partnering generation based on renewable energy
[4]. In this work, three different coal phase-out scenarios are
modeled for the years 2022 and 2030. Their impact on power
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prices and plant deployment are studied with the help of a
detailed electricity market simulation model.
Since market liberalization, many detailed energy system
models have been developed for facilitating power market
analysis. According to [5], these can be classified into the
three categories of optimization, equilibrium, and simulation
models. Among these, optimization and some simulation mod-
els have a high level of technological explicitness, as they
consider the relevant technical constraints affecting generation
units in detail, and they model individual generation units
in a non-aggregated manner. For example, [6] presents an
optimization model applying game theory concepts. In the
underlying optimization problem, a large number of technical
parameters are taken into account through constraints, which
restrict the flexibility of the generation units. [7] develop a
deterministic optimization model aiming at finding the cost-
optimal design of the power supply system. [8] provide an
example of a long-term comprehensive optimization model.
The model is a technology-based energy and material flow
model, which optimizes production and investment decisions
within different energy systems. Some electricity market opti-
mization models are also coupled with network grid models,
as can be seen in [9], or [10]. Such models are used to find
cost-optimal solutions while considering network constraints.
In [10], control reserve requirement is simplified and taken
into account via a base load to be covered all year around
by thermal generation units. [9] focuses on spot markets and
congestion management, but does not consider control reserve
provisioning.
Among the simulation models, agent-based models of elec-
tricity markets are very popular; [11] provide a survey of
many of these approaches. Among the agent-based simulation
models are some large-scale models of markets in different
countries, such as PowerACE for Germany [12], [13], NEM-
SIM for Australia [14], AMES for New England (USA) [15],
or EMCAS [16], which has been developed in the United
States and was applied to different national markets.
While many of the mentioned models are highly accurate in
representing individual plants with their technical constraints,
they usually do not model the market interaction of plant op-
erators in detail. This makes them less suitable for estimating
price developments in future market configurations. Besides,
the interrelations between different markets in the power
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sector, such as control reserve markets, or heat marketing
by combined heat and power plants, are usually not modeled
explicitly. In real markets, theses aspects are very relevant, so
that they need to be taken into account, which is done in the
model used for the analysis presented here.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Sec-
tion II describes the proposed model, while Section III reviews
the scenarios and assumptions investigated in this contribution.
Section IV discusses the model results, and Section V finally
concludes.
II. THE MODEL
In the following, the modeling approach followed in this
work is presented. Section II-A gives an overview of the model
structure, and Section II-B describes the simulation sequence.
A. Overview of the Model Structure
The market model has a quarter-hour time resolution. It
models an energy-only market coupled with a simplified
control reserve procurement market. The two represent central
electricity markets which operate independently from each
other, and on which a large number of market players can act
and develop their bidding strategies. The model also includes
a heating market, where district heating is provided cost-
efficiently to connected consumers. The model focus is on
the German markets, while cross-border electricity transfers
are accounted for through exogenous time series. The actors
consist of fossil fuel-fired power plants and energy storage
facilities. The supply from run-of-river, wind and photovoltaic
power plants, which depends on meteorological factors, does
not actively participate in trading in the chosen methodology.
Instead, their feed-in is deducted in advance from the price-
inelastic demand (exogenous load profile), which is equivalent
to priority feed-in. A model structure overview is represented
in Figure 1, which shows the model exogenous input data, and
the data flow in the model.
B. Sequence of Actions
One simulation run of an entire year comprises several
sequential steps. In a preparation phase, a simplified merit
order model is calculated on the basis of nominal capacity
and marginal costs of the fossil fuel-fired power plants and
the residual load time series. This calculation is done for the
purpose of generating a price forward curve for the entire
year in 15 min time resolution. This price expectation is then
available to all market participants for formulating their bids.
In each time step (15 min) of the main phase, the markets are
cleared in a defined order:
1) Demand from district heating is calculated, and cogen-
eration plants compete for serving the thermal load.
2) Market participants that are technically able formulate
their bids on the control reserve market, based on a
defined bidding strategy. After clearing, they receive the
information on the market result.
3) Trading on the energy-only market takes place. Market
participants determine their bids, again based on a
defined bidding strategy. After clearing, they receive the
information on the market result.
4) The market results determine the operation of all plants,
which form the starting point for the next iteration.
In each time step, the current operational state of each
plant, and the technical constraints – for example ramping
constraints – form the basis of the bids. The plants’ success
on either of the markets determines the bidding strategy for
the following market(s), and, finally, the operational state of
the plant in the following time step. For example, a plant that
successfully sold control reserve capacity needs to operate at
a certain generation level, and therefore strives to sell the
related output on the energy-only market. Following [17],
market participants distinguish two parts of the capacity when
formulating their bids: (i) the minimum capacity level which
is necessary for avoiding cost-intensive shut-down and later
restart, or for fulfilling obligations from previous markets (e. g.
the minimum stable output, if the plant has successfully sold
positive control reserve), and (ii) the flexible capacity which
can be supplied if prices are high enough to make the operation
profitable. The corresponding bid price is determined as in
[17]. The bid price formulation takes into account opportunity
costs (based on the price forward curve), possible restart cost
(for the minimum capacity level) and variable generation cost
(for the flexible capacity).
Following this, an internal optimization of the power plant
operation is done by each operator of a power plant portfolio,
based on the market success. Control power deployment is
decided on the basis of an exogenous time series and on the
energy price of the control reserve bid. Finally, each agent
determines the final net operational power of each of his
plants for the current 15 min trading interval, before the same
sequence is repeated for the next interval.
III. SCENARIOS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Three different coal phase-out scenarios were defined and
simulated in the current analysis, which are summarized in
Table I. The scenarios also help to illustrate the model’s
potential regarding the conclusions that can be drawn from the
market results. The year 2017 was used as a reference year for
all scenarios. The different assumptions made are based on the
final report of the Commission on Growth, Structural Change,
and Employment assembled by the German government [3] (in
the following named Coal Commission). In the final report, a
proposal for a complete coal phase-out by the year 2038 is
given.
All three alternative scenarios include a substantial reduc-
tion in installed capacity from coal-fired power plants. Since
the shut-down of coal-based power plants is motivated by
climate policy goals, it is assumed that older, comparatively
less efficient power plants will be shut down first. The decision
on shut-down in the scenarios is done on the basis of the
plant’s specific CO2 emissions during operation. The total
capacity decommissioned is shown in Table I. Since only
entire power plant units can be shut down, the decommissioned
capacity in the model deviates slightly from the specifications
of the Coal Commission in some cases.
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TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF THE SIMULATED SCENARIOS
Scenario S1 Scenario S2 Scenario S3
Fossil-fired generation capacity (difference to the reference 2017)
Lignite −4.8GW −10.9GW −10.9GW
Hard Coal −7.6GW −14.9GW −14.9GW
Nuclear no change −11.4GW −11.4GW
Natural Gas no change no change +20.0GW
Renewable capacity 91.9GW 187.5GW 187.5GW
Electricity demand 493.3TWh/a 493.3TWh/a 493.3TWh/a
Fuel prices Ref. 2017 Ref. 2017 Ref. 2017
1 According to ENTSOE [2].
2 Based on [18], applied to reference year 2017.
Scenario S1 considers decommissioning according to the
measures proposed by the Coal Commission until the end of
2022, where 4.8 GW of lignite and 7.6 GW should be shut
down. Scenarios S2 and S3 also implement the measures pro-
posed by the Coal Commission until the end of 2030, resulting
in a total of 10.9 GW lignite and 14.9 GW hard coal stopping
their operation. Also, both scenarios S2 and S3 take into
account the implementation of the nuclear phase-out decided
in 2011, by which the currently remaining nuclear power plant
capacity of about 11.4 GW will also be decommissioned.
In scenario S3, it is assumed that an expansion of natural
gas-fired power plants happens, in contrast to scenario S2.
The installed capacity of gas power plants is required to
compensate for the capacity bottlenecks in scenario S2 and,
thus, ensure the security of supply. The amount of additional
capacity is based on the maximum shortfall of the energy-
only market in scenario S2. This assumption also follows
the request of the Coal Commission in its final report, i. e.
that investment incentives should be set in a timely manner
so that there is no time divergence between the demand for
secure generation capacity and the completion of sufficient
new plants (cf. [3, p.67]). Renewable energy feed-in from wind
and photovoltaic plants remains unchanged in scenario S1,
whereas scenarios S2 and S3 assumes a generation capacity
expansion. The expansion followed in the definition of the
scenarios is based on path proposed by [18].
All further input data of the validated reference year 2017
are equal across all scenarios. This implies that no changes
in fuel prices, demand for electricity as well as output and
capacity of energy storage facilities are assumed. This as-
sumption ensures that the analysis of the effects on market
dynamics is better comparable, and is not affected by further
assumptions on the future. Also, it reduces the number of
changed parameters, which makes it easier to trace causes and
effects.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
One pivotal objective of electricity trading is to ensure
the security of supply, i. e. the balance between production
and consumption. The reduction in installed capacity and the
development of variable renewable energy resources may lead
to situations in which this balance can no longer be easily
maintained. To make the gap in security of supply visible in
the three alternative scenarios, the market model was used
to quantify the number of time intervals (15 min) in which
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Fig. 1. Overview of the structure of the market model
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the market demand was not fulfilled, or in which the residual
load is negative. This can be taken as an indication of how
much additional controllable generation (or other forms of
flexibility) is required when phasing out coal.
The time intervals of unfulfilled market demand (deficit) are
those quarters of an hour, in which demand could not be fully
served, despite the fact that the overall installed generation
capacity is higher than the peak load. If a deficit occurs, it
is due to technical constraints that make it impossible for
a plant operator to offer (more) electricity to the market.
These constraints include maximum ramp rates and minimum
shutdown time of the different power plants. If no other
capacity was built than assumed in the respective scenario,
this deficit would have to be covered by imports. Negative
residual load refers to a situation in which generation from
VRE exceeds the market demand, and the extra amount should
be either curtailed or exported.
The summaries of some simulation results are displayed in
Table II. It shows that while in scenario S1, there are only 25
time intervals with deficit in the market, with a total volume
of about 4.9 GWh, the considerable reduction in coal output
along with the nuclear phase-out in scenario S2 has higher
impacts on the security of supply. In nearly 2 000 quarters
of an hour, the demand on the market cannot be met from
domestic generation, resulting in a deficit of about 2.8 TWh/a
(equivalent to 0.5 % of the annual demand). The maximum
power deficit is quite substantial, with 19.6 GW. However, if
just this capacity (rounded to 20 GW) is added to the system
in the form of natural gas power plants, as it is assumed in
Scenario S3, 69 time intervals with deficit remain, as the plants
cannot all be available when needed due to their technical
constraints. The result may not be very surprising, given that
S2 and S3 assume the shut-down of 37.2 GW of conventional
generation in total, but is shows that the additionally installed
95.6 GW of renewable capacity do not substantially decrease
the need for controllable power plants – or other forms of
positive flexibility – and that these are only deployed at a few
times in a year.
TABLE II
KEY FIGURES FOR DEFICITS AND NEGATIVE RESIDUAL LOADS ON THE
ENERGY-ONLY MARKET IN SCENARIOS S1-S3
Scenario S1 Scenario S2 Scenario S3
Deficit
Time intervals (15 min) 25 1 908 69
Maximum power 3.1GW 19.6GW 4.8GW
Total energy 4.9GWh/a 2 836GWh/a 23GWh/a
Negative residual load
Time intervals (15 min) 0 3 510 3 528
Maximum power 0GW 42.9GW 42.9GW
Total energy 0GWh/a 7 929GWh/a 7 929GWh/a
A comparison of resulting electricity market prices with the
reference scenario shows that the reduction of coal-fired power
generation increases prices in all three alternative scenarios.
Table III shows the summarized results for average (mean
base), peak (workdays 8 a.m. – 6 p.m.) and off-peak (remain-
ing times) electricity prices. The highest increase in prices was
TABLE III
MEAN BASE, PEAK AND OFF-PEAK ELECTRICITY PRICES FOR SCENARIOS
S1-S3 AND REFERENCE CASE
Reference S1 S2 S3
Base (EUR/MWh) 35.45 47.70 52.65 45.11
Peak (EUR/MWh) 37.72 53.06 54.00 47.17
Off-Peak (EUR/MWh) 33.07 40.50 51.57 42.60
seen in scenario S2, due to the sharp decline installed capacity
of fossil-fired generation. Many situations were observed in
which expensive (gas-fired) peak-load power plants are in
merit, as cheaper large-scale power plant technologies are
no longer available. These more expensive time intervals
more than compensate the low market prices that occur when
renewable supply is high, resulting in an overall price increase.
It can also be noticed that higher shares of VRE resources
increase the electricity price volatility, as shown in Figure 2.
The figure represents a comparison of the prices using an
example week (June). The effect of VRE share on price
volatility is most strongly illustrated in scenario S2 since it is
an extreme scenario (high VRE and low fossil-fired capacity).
Discontinuities in the figure are due to time points with nega-
tive residual load. As VRE provide their power to the market
at a price-independent bid, the lowest allowable price occurs
in these intervals (here implemented as −3 000EUR/MWh).
The amount of energy generated by each technology varies
between the scenarios. Figure 3 shows that the usage of lignite
and hard coal decreases in S1-S3 compared to the reference,
in compliance with the goals of a coal phase-out. The only
exception is the increase in electricity generation from hard
coal power plants in scenario S1: despite a reduction of
installed capacity by 7.6 GW, electricity generation increases.
This is due to the simultaneous decrease in the installed lignite
capacity by 4.8 GW, which moves the comparatively more
expensive hard coal-fired power plants left in the merit order,
thus increasing their frequency of market success.
Interestingly, the addition of 20 GW of new natural gas-fired
generation units in scenario S3 does not lead to a significant
reduction in electricity generation from the remaining coal-
fired power plants, due to the lower variable generation cost of
the latter. Power generation from lignite is the same in S2 and
S3, while generation from hard coal is only down by 3 TWh
(≈ 5%) in S3 in comparison with S2. It can also be seen that
the addition of gas power plants in scenario S3 does not lead to
a significant increase in electricity generation from this energy
source, from which a low frequency of use can be derived.
The full load hours of the entire gas-fired portfolio fall from
2 900 h/a (S2) to 1 600 h/a (S3). This finding emphasizes that
investments into new generation capacity might not happen
without subsidies or some form of capacity mechanism, as
not all plants are economically viable.
V. CONCLUSION
The results from a detailed electricity simulation model
introduced here have shown that the currently discussed
phase-out of coal-fired power generation in association with
the expansion of renewable energy deployment will change
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Fig. 2. Detailed view of electricity prices in reference scenario, and scenarios S1 - S3, for a week in June with very high feed-in of renewable energy
resources.
market dynamics considerably. This process must, therefore,
be backed by some strategy of facilitating investments into
alternative controllable generation capacities or other forms
of flexibility. Based on the assumptions made, it was shown
that the increasing volatility of the market will lead to supply
deficits, if no additional controllable generation capacity is
installed. Otherwise, larger amounts of imports must be used
to cover the observed shortages of domestic supply in the
scenarios simulated here. Besides, a growing number of time
steps with generation surplus was observed with the expan-
sion of VRE resources. Adding another 20 GW of gas-fired
power generation capacity did not completely overcome the
challenges, as shown in the scenario S3 defined in this work.
The findings illustrate the need for additional flexibility
options to be made available to the system for backing up the
coal phase-out. It was also shown that these new investments
might not all be profitable, as some capacity is only deployed
in a few time intervals per year. This highlights the necessity of
providing incentives for those investments that are necessary to
ensure the security of supply in the future low-carbon German
electricity system.
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